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Oberstenaffäre
By Sebastian Steiner
The so-called “Oberstenaffäre” (colonel’s affair) was a political scandal in Switzerland which
erupted after details of a close cooperation between Swiss, German, and Austro-Hungarian
military intelligence agencies emerged during World War I. Between 1915 and 1916, the affair
evolved into one of the most serious internal political crises in Switzerland and influenced the
course of Swiss neutrality.
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From December 1914 onwards, Colonels Karl Egli (1865-1925) and Friedrich Moritz von Wattenwyl
(1867-1942) – both leading members of the Swiss General Staff – began to covertly hand over
sensitive, decoded Russian diplomatic dispatches to the German authorities on a regular basis.
Additionally, from February 1915 onwards, they also shared confidential Swiss military bulletins with
the German and Austro-Hungarian representatives in Berne.
Yet, the Swiss government was not aware of this delicate form of cooperation, until André Langie
(1871-1961), a renowned cryptograph responsible for decoding the dispatches, realized that the
Russian dispatches he was decoding would most probably be transferred to the Central Powers. In
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his view, Colonels Egli and von Wattenwyl were violating and endangering Swiss neutrality, which
had been proclaimed at the beginning of the war. Langie, from the French-speaking part of
Switzerland, informed two leading French-speaking journalists – Albert Bonnard (1858-1917) and
national council Edouard Secretan (1848-1917) – at the end of November. Following Secretan’s
advice, Langie informed the Swiss Federal Council of his findings at the beginning of December
1915. The Russian and French ambassadors in Berne lodged an official complaint shortly
afterwards.
When the Germanophile Swiss General Ulrich Wille (1848-1925) was officially informed about the
matter by the Federal Council, he initially tried to cover up the affair: Egli and von Wattenwyl were
discretely removed from the General Staff and redeployed to other posts within the army. However,
the French-speaking politicians who had also been informed by Langie were not satisfied with the
way the army leadership handled the situation.
Together with other journalists and politicians, they decided to take the matter further. On 14 January
1916, the affair was made public with an editorial in the French-speaking newspaper La Sentinelle.
The social-democratic, German-speaking and army-critical Berner Tagwacht and the Volksrecht
followed the next day. Resulting mainly from the internal divide between the French and German-
speaking parts of the country and the international situation, the press campaign marked the
beginning of a political scandal which shook the Swiss political scene to its very foundations. The
affair dominated public debate for more than two months.
To a great part of the francophone population and politicians of Switzerland alike, the cooperation with
the German and Austro-Hungarian intelligence agencies clearly violated Swiss neutrality. The
following cover-up strategy of General Wille was perceived as a blatant example of the pro-German
sentiment within the military. Under an ever-increasing public pressure, the Federal Council forced
the General to take further steps and to start legal proceedings in a military court. The trial finally took
place in Zurich on 28 January 1916. The two colonels were charged with violation of neutrality and
misconduct.
In the course of the trial, von Wattenwyl and Egli did not deny having delivered the bulletins, but
argued that this had been necessary in order to get important intelligence information from the
Central Powers in return. The more delicate deciphered Russian dispatches, however, were not at
the core of the trial.[1] Both of the accused colonels even denied the exchange of such documents.
The pair was eventually acquitted by the court and left to be disciplined by the General, who
sentenced them to the maximum penalty of twenty days of arrest. The Federal Council then
dismissed them from the army.
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The trial, which was orchestrated and influenced by the German-friendly army leaders and the
government, did not calm public sentiment. On the contrary, the acquittal reinforced the distrust that
sections of the population already felt towards the army. In the short-term, it also seemed to deepen
the rift between the French-speaking and German-speaking parts of Switzerland. Most of the
francophone and social democratic newspapers expressed great indignation at the verdict. In the
following session of parliament, primarily French-speaking representatives protested strongly against
the politics of the government and the army leadership. They demanded the limitation of the Federal
Council’s extraordinary powers (“Vollmachten”) and even called for the dismissal of the disputed
General Wille. Due to the lack of willingness of the Federal Council and the majority of German-
speaking parliamentarians, these initiatives finally failed.
As a consequence of the affair, the relationship between the Federal Council and the army leadership
became increasingly strained, which in turn also strained the relation of the Federal Councillors
among themselves and weakened the government in time of turmoil. The government subsequently
reduced the influence of the Germanophile army leadership on domestic policy and recalibrated
military-civilian relations after the parliamentary session in which the affair was discussed. A year
later, this tendency was amplified, as the French-speaking and Entente-oriented Gustave Ador
(1845-1928) was elected to the Federal Council. The Election was, on the one hand, an important
goodwill gesture for the Entente, on the other a sign for a stronger integration of the French speaking
part of Switzerland into the political system. Thus, in the long run, the events might even have
contributed to the cohesion of the different language groups in the further course of the war.
In contrast, the affair enhanced disintegration along social and political lines. Shortly after the
“Oberstenaffäre” (colonel’s affair), the Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SPS) handed in a
popular initiative which demanded the abolishment of military justice. This initiative played an
important role in unifying the party in regard to military policy. Therefore, the affair was a turning point
for the social democrats in the path from the party truce at the beginning of the war towards a
categorical refusal of national defence in 1917.
On an international scale, one can say that there was a certain degree of enhanced military threat
during the crisis. French military strategists simultaneously developed plans to cross Swiss territory
into Germany (“Plan H”). However, the German offensive at Verdun led the French leadership to
finally drop the preparations. For the Entente, and particularly for France, the affair was in fact a
chance to revitalise the then strained relations with Switzerland. Without giving up the ties to the
Central Powers, the first secret military talks about a military cooperation in the event of a potential
German violation of Swiss neutrality followed in June 1916.[2] The affair therefore contributed to a
gradual change of Swiss neutrality, as the country began step-by-step to shift towards the Entente.
Sebastian Steiner, Universität Bern
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